We consider a wiretap channel with an eavesdropper (Eve) and an honest but curious relay (Ray). Ray and the destination (Bob) are full-duplex (FD) devices. In order to prevent Ray from getting information on the secret message, we consider the scaled compute-and-forward (SCF) where scaled lattice coding is used in the transmission by both the source (Alice) and Bob in order to allow Ray to decode only a linear combination of the two messages. At the same time Ray transmits artificial noise (AN) to confuse Eve. When Ray relays the decoded linear combination, Alice and Bob are transmitting AN against Eve. With respect to existing literature the innovations of this paper are: a) Bob and Ray are FD devices; b) Alice, Ray and Bob transmit also AN; and c) the channel to Eve is not known to Alice, Bob and Ray. For this scenario we derive bounds on both the secrecy outage probability and the achievable secrecy-outage rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
The next generation of mobile communication systems (5G) will most probably encompass various technological innovations, including among others, full-duplex (FD) devices [1] and multi-hop (relayed) transmissions. It has also been advocated [2] that in this context cryptography should be complemented by physical layer security (PLS) approaches.
In this paper we focus on PLS solutions for a relay-assisted communication, where both the relay and the destination are FD devices. It has already been shown the advantage of cooperation (relaying) for physical layer security [3] , which motivates the focus on this approach. For example in a cellular 5G system, a mobile terminal (MT) may transmit a secret message to a FD base station (BS), with the assistance of a network FD relay. This scenario has been considered in the literature, e.g., for FD relay see [4] , [5] and references therein. In [6] an un-authenticated relay was considered (to be kept in the darkness of the secret message), and the destination sent artificial noise (AN) during the source's transmission, and both an upper bound on the secret rate and achievable rates were derived. When the relay is secure, linear precoding schemes can be applied on a decode and forward (DF) transmission with AN [7] . Amplify and forward (AF) relaying and simultaneous jamming by other nodes has been considered in [8] , where selection of relay and jamming nodes has been addressed.
The case of FD destination without relaying is considered in [9] in the absence of channel-state information (CSI) on the eavesdropper channel, and in [10] under various CSI assumptions on the legitimate and eavesdropper channels. The case of a communication between single-antenna devices assisted by a multi-antenna FD relay is considered in [11] , where joint information and jamming beamforming are designed to guarantee secrecy. A DF solution for FD relaying is also considered in [12] showing the advantages of FD over half-duplex (HD) network solutions. The multi-source multirelay scenario has been considered in various papers (see [13] and references therein), with and without AF/DF and various knowledge of the CSI of the eavesdropper channel, and selection of sources and relays have been optimized. In [14] a modulo-and-forward scheme is considered for a single relay without eavesdropper, and in the case of no CSI the outage probability is derived. In [15] a scaled compute-andforward (SCF) scheme was introduced, and the presence of an eavesdropper was also considered. However the source and destination nodes perfectly know the CSI to the eavesdropper, which is not always a realistic assumption.
In this paper we consider that both Ray and Bob are FD. Since we aim at not revealing information on the secret message to the relay, we consider the SCF. At the same time Ray transmits AN to confuse Eve. When Ray relays the decoded linear combination, Alice and Bob are transmitting AN against Eve. With respect to existing literature the innovations of this paper are: a) Bob and Ray are FD devices; b) Alice, Ray and Bob transmit also AN; and c) the channel to Eve is not known to Alice, Bob and Ray. For this scenario we derive a bound on the secrecy outage probability. In particular, for the case of Rayleigh fading conditions of the channels to Eve, we derive a closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability bound.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a relay network with a device (Alice) willing to convey a message to another device (Bob), with the help of a relay (Ray). The message must remain secret to a potential passive eavesdropper (Eve), whose location (and even existence) is unknown to both Alice and Bob. Ray is always honest, thus he complies with the transmission protocol rules and aims at supporting Alice and Bob at best. However, he is curious, i.e., willing to know the secret message: thus the communication protocol ensures that the message remains secret also to him. In any case, Eve and Ray are not colluding to get information on the secret message.
Both Alice and Eve 1 are assumed to be HD devices, while both Bob and Ray have FD capabilities. All users are equipped with a single antenna. The devices have a maximum unitary transmit power, and we assume that each receiver is subject to a zero-mean unitary-power additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Extension to the case of devices equipped with multiple antennas is left for future study.
We assume that there is no direct link between Alice and Bob, therefore the support of Ray is needed. Among antennas we have flat, reciprocal and AWGN channels. Let Γ xy be instantaneous the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of between nodes x and y, with x, y ∈ {A, B, R, E}. Moreover, 1/λ x is the average SNR of Eve-x link. Since we assume that the relay is curious but honest, we assume that he let Alice and Bob perfectly know the correct channel gains. On the other hand, Eve is not honest and the legitimate terminals can only assume the statistics of their channel to Eve. For example, it is reasonable to assume Rayleigh fading and it could be meaningful to assume a minimum distance of Eve from other nodes, thus setting a minimum reference average SNR of channels to her.
Notation: H(·) and I(·; ·) denote the entropy and the mutual information normalized per channel use, respectively.
III. SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
The secure communication protocol comprises two phases, whose transmission activities are reported in Fig. 1 . Solid lines represent transmission of messages, while dashed lines represent transmissions of zero-mean Gaussian AN. In the first phase Alice encodes a secret message M A with rate R S into the signal X A and transmits it. At the same time Bob transmits random data with signal X B . Ray transmits AN and Eve listens to ongoing transmissions, receiving signal Y E . In the second phase Ray transmits signal X R while both Alice and Bob transmit AN. Eve receivesȲ .
Coding in the two phases is based on SCF. Starting from a lattice Λ, we construct two lattices Λ A , Λ B ⊂ Λ, having unitary second moment, being good in both quantizing and shaping sense of [16] . Let V A and V B be the fundamental Voronoi region of Λ A and Λ B , respectively. Let also a 1 , a 2 ∈ Z, and β A , β B ∈ R + .
In particular in the first phase Alice applies random binning [15] by selecting a lattice vector S A ∈ Λ∩V A . Then she transmits the lattice vector
where D A is dither uniformly chosen from the scaled Voronoi region V A /β A . Let R 0 be the random signal rate and
the rate of S A . On his side, Bob chooses V B ∈ Λ ∩ V B uniformly at random and transmits
Since we are considering Eve as a passive eavesdropper, nothing changes if we assume that she is FD. 
(conditions for successful decoding will be discussed in the following section), and computesŨ = U/a 1 (mod Λ A ). In the second phase Ray encodesŨ with a secrecy capacity achieving code using a random message with rate R R , and transmits the encoded message X R with rate R R + R A . We want Bob to decode the secret message at the end of the two phases, by letting at the same time Ray and Eve in the darkness of the secret message. The purpose of transmissions of X B and ANs is to obtain secrecy. Ray, beyond operating according to the protocol, will also try to get information on the secret message. Note that the AN generated by Alice in the second phase does not affect Bob, since Bob does not receive signals from Alice.
This protocol is a generalization of the protocol described in [15] for the following reasons: a) Bob and Ray are FD devices; b) Alice, Ray and Bob transmit also AN; and c) the channel to Eve is not known to Alice, Bob and Ray.
In the following we assume that the achievable rate of the resulting Ray-Bob channel is higher than that of the Alice-Ray channel, in the absence of Bob transmissions 2 .
A. Decodability Conditions
We first consider here the conditions on the various parameters (a 1 , a 2 , β A and β B ) and rates (R A and R B ) that ensure decodability of the secret message S A at Bob.
For decodability with vanishing error probability at Ray of U with infinite codeword length we must have [15] 
For decodability of the secret message sent by Ray in the second phase we must ensure
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
We now consider the secrecy conditions for the proposed protocol. We will first consider the case without Eve, where we only prevent Ray from get any information on M A , and then consider the case in which Eve is also present.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate Without Eve
We assume now that Eve is not present. Then, the protocol must ensures secrecy only with respect to Ray. The resulting system corresponds to the scenario of [15] for which the achievable secrecy rate is bounded as
with the maximum achieved with a 1 = a 2 = 1 and
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate With Eve
Since here we assume that legitimate users only have a statistical description of the channel to Eve, we do not employ the approach of [15] that imposed that a linear combination of messages transmitted by Alice and Bob was also decodable by Eve. Moreover, we should also take into account the fact that Eve receives the message sent by Ray.
About Eve, we only aim at preventing her from getting information on the secret message, not caring if she decodes some liner combination of Alice and Bob messages. Therefore two actions will be taken:
• in the first phase Ray transmits AN that will lower the decoding capabilities of Eve, and • in the second phase Ray encodes with a random binning approach his message. These two actions will not be enough to guarantee secrecy against Eve, since her channels are not known and an outage event may occur. We can upper-bound the outage probability (i.e., the probability of occurrence of an outage event) by computing the probability that there is a secrecy leakage to Eve in either of the two phases. Let O i be the outage event in phase i = 1, 2. We derive a superset of the outage event in the first phase, i.e., O 1 ⊆Ō 1 , and we will upper-bound the outage probability as
where A C represents the complementary event to event A. Remark: We must ensure that in the second phase Eve does not get any information on both Alice and Bob messages, since even a leakage on Bob's message could help her in extracting information on M A from what she received in the first phase.
Remark: We still need to ensure that Ray does not get any information on the secret message, hence (6) must still hold.
We now detail the actions and the corresponding secrecy outage probabilities.
First Phase: The information leakage rate on M A to Eve is
where in the second line we observe that if Eve knows M A she can subtract X A from Y E (to obtain Y E ), and H(X A , X B |Y E , M A ) = H(X B |Y E ) (since by knowing M A she also knows X A ). We thus obtain the upper bound
Now, from the definition of the capacity of the multiple access channel (MAC) from Alice and Bob to Eve C M AC (X A , X B ; Y E ) (considering also the AN transmitted by Ray) we have
Unfortunately, it is hard to to lower bound I(X B ; Y E ). We can consider two cases, either Eve is able to decode Bob message from Y E , or not. Considering the lattice coding, from [17] the first case occurs if
On the other hand, if Eve is not able to decode Bob's message we can only upper bound R L as follows
Since Alice applies random binning, a subset (Ō 1 ) C ⊂Ō C 1 of the non secrecy-outage event is given by
Therefore (8) becomes
Second Phase: In the second phase we aim at preventing Eve from getting any information on both Alice and Bob messages. Alice and Bob transmit AN and Ray will employ random binning. Note that we cannot utilize the randomness of the first phase for secrecy purposes, since Eve may have decoded the randomness of the first phase (while not being 
able of getting any information on the secret message) and can exploit this knowledge in the second phase. This is why we need a second random binning process. Therefore we have a secrecy outage event when
C. Rayleigh Fading Scenario
We now derive the closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability bound for the case in which all links with Eve are characterized by Rayleigh fading. Please refer to Table  I for the notation used in this Section.
and analogously
For the second phase we have C(X R ;Ȳ ) = log 2 1 + ΓER 1+ΓAE+ΓBE , and
Hence we have
We observe that
which always occurs if µφ ≥ 1, while it requires
Moreover, condition O C 2 has no effect if
which always occurs if νφ ≥ 1, and which occurs when
Considering the definition of Z(A, B, C, D, C , D , E, F, F ) in (25)-(35) reported in the next page, Therefore we have the following cases 1) Case µφ ≥ 1 and φν < 1.
2) Case µφ ≥ 1 and φν ≥ 1. This will lead to
This will imply φν < 1 and will lead to
or µ φ ≥ 1, νφ < 1 and Γ ER ≤ Γ, or µ φ < 1, νφ < 1 and Γ ER ≤ min{Γ, γ }. Moreover, condition O C 2 has no effect if Γ ER < φ. Lastly, if µ ≤ ν, S 2 reduces to S 2 = {Γ AE +Γ BE −µ Γ ER ≤ µ} (the other bound has no effect). Therefore we have the following cases 1) Case µ φ ≥ 1, µ > ν and φν ≥ 1.
This will lead to P[S 2 , O C 2 ] = Z(0, φ, ν, ν, 0, 0, 0, µ ) + Z(φ, ∞, 1/φ, −1, 0, 0, 1, µ ) + Z(φ, ∞, ν, ν, 1/φ, −1, 0, µ ).
2) Case µ φ ≥ 1, µ > ν and φν < 1.
This will lead to P[S 2 , O C 2 ] = Z(0, φ, ν, ν, 0, 0, 0, µ ) + Z(φ, Γ, 1/φ, −1, 0, 0, 1, µ ) + Z(φ, Γ, ν, ν, 1/φ, −1, 0, µ ).
This will lead to P[S 2 , O C 2 ] = Z(0, φ, ν, ν, 0, 0, 0, µ ) + Z(φ, min{γ , Γ}, 1/φ, −1, 0, 0, 1, µ ) + Z(φ, min{γ , Γ}, ν, ν, 1/φ, −1, 0, µ ). 5) Case µ φ < 1 and µ ≤ ν. This will lead to P[S 2 , O C 2 ] = Z(0, φ, µ , µ , 0, 0, 0, µ ) + Z(φ, γ , 1/φ, −1, 0, 0, 1, µ ) + Z(φ, γ , µ , µ , 1/φ, −1, 0, µ ).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to show an example of performance of the considered system, we consider Γ AR = 20 dB, Γ BR = 10 dB. 
We first have spanned the value of β A /β B and found the achievable region of (R A , R B ) couples, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Then we set λ A = λ R = 1, and λ B = 2, and R S = 0.1 bit/s/Hz, and R R = 7 bit/s/Hz. Fig. 3 shows the bound on the secrecy outage probability (in a log scale) as a function of R A and R B . Note that we have only shown the values ofP out in correspondence of valid couples R A and R B that ensure the decodability conditions for the secret message at Bob, while not leaking any information to Ray. We also identify the couple (R A , R B ) providing the minimumP out , which is about 10 −5 .
In general, we observe that increasing R A reduces the chances of leaking information to Eve in the first phase (since we can increase R 0 ). On the other hand, since Ray transmits the secret message at rate R A , we potentially have an information leakage in the second phase since the rate of the random message R R − R A is decreased. Fig. 4 shows the secrecy probability outage boundP out vs R S for three values of R R . R A and R B have been optimized to minimizeP out . We observe that as R S increases, the outage bound increases too, since the random message rates R 0 and (R R − R A ) in the two phases are reduced. Also, increasing R R provides a lowerP out since it allows to better protect the second phase, increasing the random message rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a secure communication scenario with a honest but curious relay and an eavesdropper. Only a partial CSI of the channel to the eavesdropper is available. Considering FD devices and letting Ray transmit AN, we have described the protocol that mixes a SCF approach and a random binning approach to provide secrecy. Then the secrecy outage probability for a Rayleigh fading scenario has been computed in a closed form. Lastly, some numerical results have provided an insight into the main features of the considered system.
